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Abstract: In Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons the Supreme Court held that the 
predatory pricing standard adopted in Brooke Group also applies to predatory 
bidding claims, because the two types of predation are “analytically similar”.  I 
argue that predatory bidding is likely to be more harmful to consumer welfare 
than is predatory pricing.  Successful input market predation may lead to a “dual 
market power” outcome in which the firm has market power in both the input and 
the output market.  In spite of the analytical distinction, consideration of error 
costs leads me to conclude that Brooke Group remains the best standard to apply 
to predatory bidding claims.
                                                 
* Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu.  This paper 
is forthcoming in The Antitrust Bulletin (2008). 
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I. Introduction 
 
In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,1 the Supreme Court 
held that the plaintiff in a predatory pricing lawsuit must show that the price 
during the predatory campaign was cut below some relevant measure of cost and 
that there was a dangerous probability that the predatory firm would recoup the 
losses from its predation campaign.2  In Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co.3 held that the standard adopted in Brooke Group also 
applies to predatory bidding claims. 
 A predatory bidding campaign is a lot like a predatory pricing campaign. 
Both involve a predation period in which the predator suffers a loss in an effort to 
drive a rival from the market, and a recoupment period in which the predator 
reaps monopoly rewards from excluding competition.  The key difference is that 
in the predatory bidding scenario, the predator bids up the price of an input, while 
in the predatory pricing scenario, the predator cuts the price of its output. 
 The Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Brooke Group standard to the input 
market predation alleged in Weyerhaeuser on the ground that predatory bidding 
was more harmful to consumers than predatory pricing.4  The Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit, and held that the two types of predation are 
“analytically similar”.5 
 I will argue here that predatory pricing and predatory bidding are analytically 
distinct in important respects.6  In particular, predatory bidding is likely to be 
more harmful to consumer welfare than is predatory pricing.  Successful input 
market predation may lead to a “dual market power” outcome in which the firm 
has market power in both the input and the output market.  This potential reward 
lends a stronger push to the incentive to engage in input market predation. 
 In spite of the analytical distinction, I conclude that the Brooke Group test 
remains the best standard to apply to predatory bidding claims.  The justification 
for the Brooke Group standard is based on a balancing of expected false acquittal 
                                                 
1 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
2 Id. at 222-24. 
3 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) 
4 Id. at 1973.  The Ninth Circuit said that predatory bidding and predatory selling “are materially 
different in that predatory bidding does not necessarily benefit consumers or stimulate competition 
in the way that predatory pricing does.”  Id. 
5 Id. at 1076. 
6 For earlier analyses of predatory pricing and predatory bidding, see Roger D. Blair & John E. 
Lopatka, Predatory Buying and the Antitrust Laws, forthcoming Utah L. Rev. (2008); John B. 
Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for 
Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Pricing?, 72 Antitrust L. J. 625 (2005); Steven 
C. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 Antitrust L. J. 669 (2005). 
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and false conviction costs.7  The economic incentive arguments that indicate 
dissimilarities between predatory pricing and predatory bidding do not imply that 
the balance of error costs should be substantially different in the two predation 
scenarios.  In other words, the incentive arguments are not sufficient to justify 
replacing Brooke Group with an alternative standard that is more favorable to 
plaintiffs in predatory bidding cases. 
 I agree with the Court’s conclusion, though I would have reached it by a 
different route.8  Instead of stressing the analytical similarity of the two types of 
predation, the Court should have put more emphasis on the error-cost rationale, 
and on identifying the costs of false convictions for input market predation.  
Bidding for inputs happens to be a substantial path through which information 
held by sophisticated buyers is communicated to prices.  Convictions for 
predatory bidding threaten to obstruct the transmission of private information to 
markets. 
 
II. Weyerhaeuser: The Facts 
 
Few antitrust cases have facts as simple as this one.  There are two players: 
Weyerhaeuser and Ross-Simons.  Both operated hardwood lumber sawmills in the 
Pacific Northwest.  Both purchased alder logs on the spot market as raw material 
for their lumber processing businesses.  The output from their lumber processing 
operations was sold in the market for hardwood finished lumber.  Thus, the 
relevant input market for this case was alder sawlogs (in the Pacific Northwest) 
and the relevant output market was hardwood finished lumber. 
 Ross-Simons began its operations in 1962.  Weyerhaeuser entered the same 
market in 1980 and became the dominant firm, accounting for 65 percent of the 
purchases of alder logs available in the region by 2001. 
 From 1998 to 2001, the price of alder logs increased while prices for finished 
hardwood lumber fell.  As a result, Ross-Simons suffered losses and shut down its 
mill in 2001.  Ross-Simons then brought an antitrust suit against Weyerhaeuser 
for unlawful monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.   Ross-
Simons claimed that Weyerhaeuser used its dominant position to drive up the 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of error costs and predation, see, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: 
Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution 214-219 (2003).  For criticism of the error-cost 
approach adopted in Brooke Group, see Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and 
Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L. J. 2239, 2242-62 (2000). 
8 In this general sense my view of the Weyerhaeuser decision is similar to that taken by Roger 
Blair and John Lopatka in their forthcoming article, supra note 6.  The differences are in the 
details of the arguments.  Blair and Lopatka explore the economics of buyer predation in greater 
detail (and with more care) than I do here, which leads them to identify weaknesses in the Court’s 
approach.  I am concerned primarily with the error cost rationale for the Brooke Group test, and 
that rationale’s application to predatory bidding. 
 3
prices of alder sawlogs, and thereby exclude Ross-Simons from the (output) 
market in hardwood finished lumber. 
 After rejecting summary judgment and other motions based on 
Weyerhaeuser’s effort to impose the Brooke Group standard on the trial court’s 
analysis, the trial court eventually instructed the jury that Ross-Simons could 
prove Weyerhaeuser’s bidding practices were monopolizing if “Weyerhaeuser 
purchased more logs than it needed or paid a higher price for logs than necessary 
in order to prevent Ross-Simons from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair 
price.”9  The jury found Weyerhaeuser guilty of monopolization.  Weyerhaeuser 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the verdict on the theory that “buy-
side predatory bidding and sell side predatory pricing, though similar, are 
materially different in that predatory bidding does not necessarily benefit 
consumers or stimulate competition in the way that predatory pricing does.”10  
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the concerns that led the Brooke Group Court 
to establish a high standard of liability in the predatory-pricing context do not 
carry over to this predatory bidding context with the same force.”11 
 
III. The Court’s Decision 
 
The Court’s decision in Weyerhaeuser is a simple and short rejection of the theory 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit.   It is a mechanical description of the reasons why 
the concerns that led to the Brooke Group standard carry over to the predatory 
bidding context.  The Court’s argument consists of the following steps: first, a 
brief description of the analytical similarity between input and output market 
predation and its recognition by antitrust scholar; second, an accounting of the 
economic similarities between predatory pricing and predatory bidding, and 
finally a peremptory statement of the reasons that the Brooke Group standard 
should apply to predatory bidding.  The interesting parts of the Court’s argument 
do not appear until we get to the second and third parts of this argument. 
 In the second step of this mechanical argument the Court notes that in both 
the predatory pricing and predatory bidding contexts we observe two stages of the 
predation game: a predation period, in which the dominant predator suffers losses, 
and then a recoupment phase, in which the predator reaps the gains from 
excluding its competitors. 
                                                 
9 Weyerhaeuser, 127 S.Ct. at 1073.  In his review of the 2006-2007 Supreme Court term, Josh 
Wright describes this jury instruction as “disastrous”, see Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court 
and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, 3 Competition Policy 
International 25, 49 (2007).  I agree with Wright’s assessment.  Such an open-ended standard 
invites a jury to apply a sense of fair play that may have been shaped by plaintiff’s lawyers rather 
than a serious consideration of the economics of the case.  
10 Weyerhaeuser, 127 S.Ct. at 1073. 
11 Id. at 1073-74. 
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 The Court also noted four procompetitive or efficiency motivations behind 
bidding up input prices or outbidding competitors: mistakes, differentiated 
impacts of product market demand shocks, greater productive efficiency on the 
part of the dominant firm, hedging against risk.12 
 The mistakes could be described as instances of the “winner’s curse”.13  In a 
competitive bidding context, the firm that wins the contest is often the one that is 
most mistaken in overvaluing the asset to be acquired.  There are strategic matters 
that could influence the size of the overbidding curse when the bidders are all 
using the asset to compete against each other in another market.  But the curse 
could be observed in the absence of such strategic pressures – e.g., it could be 
observed when people are bidding for houses or antiques. 
 The Court’s second procompetitive justification is that a firm might bid up 
prices to respond to increased demand for its product.  The Court may have had 
the differentiated products setting in mind.  In the case of homogeneous products, 
an increase in demand would ordinarily affect the bidding of all participants by 
the same amount.  A differential effect in which one firm bids more than the other 
would be observed only if the firms are not equally informed about the demand 
increases, or their products are differentiated. 
 The productive efficiency rationale for bidding up the price of an input is 
observed in the case in which one firm is a more efficient user of the input than is 
the other firm.  If firm A is a more productive processor of an input than its 
competitor, firm B, then the value of that input will be greater to firm A.  Firm A 
will therefore outbid firm B in a spot market auction.  The outbidding by firm A 
may have nothing to do with any strategy on the part of A to drive B from the 
market. 
 The last procompetitive justification the Court offered for outbidding is the 
case in which one firm purchases an amount that appears to be excessive as a 
hedge against the risk of future rises in input costs or input shortages.  Of course, 
if the future cost increase or shortage impacts all firms in the upstream market in 
the same manner, each should be willing to bid as much as the other.  Outbidding 
might be observed, however, when there is some informational asymmetry among 
the upstream competitors.  If one firm predicts that a shortage will occur and the 
other does not, the relatively pessimistic firm will outbid its relatively optimistic 
competitor. 
 The second step of the Court’s argument also includes a comparison of the 
benefits to consumers, during the first-stage predatory campaign, in the predatory 
pricing and predatory bidding settings.14  If one compares the input suppliers in 
                                                 
12 Id. at 1077. 
13 For a straightforward description, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winner's_curse.  For a 
survey, see Richard H. Thaler, The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. Econ. Perspectives 191 (1988). 
14  Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1077-78 
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the bidding predation market with the consumer in the pricing predation market, 
the comparison would be appropriate.  In the output price predation setting, 
predation offers a “boon to consumers”15 as the output price is driven below the 
competitive level (marginal cost).  In the input market, bidding predation offers an 
equivalent boon to input suppliers, as input prices are driven above competitive 
levels.  The input suppliers in the predatory bidding context are the counterparts 
to the consumers in the predatory pricing context.  If a straightforward analysis of 
social welfare were conducted, the same conclusions concerning the welfare 
effects of predatory pricing could be derived for the case of predatory bidding. 
 In spite of the neat analogy between consumers in the first stage of the 
predatory pricing campaign and suppliers in the first stage of the predatory 
bidding campaign, the Court chose to focus on ultimate consumers in both 
settings.  The Court relegated its discussion of the benefits to suppliers to a 
footnote.16  Having committed itself to a comparison of ultimate consumers in 
both settings, the Court could offer only weak claims about the benefits predatory 
bidding provides to consumers.  The Court argued that since predatory bidding 
could take place in a setting in which the output market is competitive, it might 
occur without having any perceptible impact on consumers. 
 The third step of the Court’s argument consists of what I have referred to as a 
peremptory application of Brooke Group.17  Given the existence of 
procompetitive cases in which firms are outbid by their rivals for access to inputs, 
the Court held that the price-cost screen of Brooke-Group has to be applied to 
predatory bidding.  In addition, the Court imposed the recoupment test on the 
same ground as in Brooke Group: as an additional screen to make sure that the 
cases that survive summary judgment are highly likely to involve real instances of 
predation. 
 
IV. Basic Economics of Input Market Predation 
 
As a backdrop for my discussion of the case, I should set out a few preliminary 
points on the economics of input market predation, and in particular on the 
exploitation of monopoly power.  After setting out these preliminary points, I will 
return to the conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court on the 
consumer welfare effects of bidding market predation. 
 
A. Economics of Market Power 
 
                                                 
15 Weyerhaeuser, 127 S.Ct. at 1077-78. 
16 Id. at 1077 n.4. 
17 Id. at 1078. 
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In the standard output market monopoly setting, the profit-maximizing 
monopolist chooses an output level such that 
 
(1)    MC
e
p
d
=− )11( , 
 
where MC is the marginal cost of supplying the product, p is the product’s price, 
and ed is the market demand elasticity.  It should be clear from (1) that the 
monopolist sets price above marginal cost (p > MC) and produces at an elastic 
portion of its demand curve (ed > 1). 
 Suppose the firm has market power in both the input and output markets.  
The monopoly-pricing condition shown in (1) changes.  Assume there is one 
variable (in the short run) input L.  The profit-maximizing monopolist employs 
the input up to the point at which 
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In this equation, MPL is the marginal product of the input factor, w is the price of 
the input, and eL is the elasticity of supply for the input. 
 In the perfectly competitive case, the value of the input’s marginal product is 
equal to the input price (i.e., pMPL = w).  In the dual market power scenario 
shown in equation (2), the output price is above the competitive level, reflecting 
the exploitation of output market power, and the input price is below the 
competitive level, reflecting exploitation of input market power. 
Using the familiar Lerner index as a measure of market power exploitation, in 
the standard output market monopoly case 
 
(3)    
dep
MCpL 1=−= . 
  
The monopolist’s ability to exploit its power is inversely related to the point 
elasticity of demand at its profit-maximizing output level.  In the dual (input and 
output) market monopoly case, the equivalent version of the Lerner index is18 
                                                 
18 For the derivation of equation (4), see Keith N. Hylton & Mark Lasser, Measuring Market 
Power When the Firm Has Power in the Input and Output Markets, 131-139, in ECONOMIC 
INPUTS, LEGAL OUTPUTS: THE ROLE OF ECONOMISTS IN MODERN ANTITRUST 
(Fred S. McChesney, ed., Wiley, 1998).  For an alternative approach using the Lerner index, see 
Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Measurement of Monopsony Power, 37 Antitrust Bull. 
133 (1992). 
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If the firm has market power in the input market, but no market power in the 
output market, the dual market power Lerner index simplifies to: 
(5)      
)1(
1
+Le
   , 
 
which implies that the firm is more effective at exploiting the input market if ed > 
eL +1 (evaluated at the profit-maximizing quantities). Thus, if given a choice, the 
firm might prefer to exploit its input market rather than its output market. 
 Notice that the dual market power Lerner index can be decomposed as 
follows: 
 
(6)    
)1(
1
1
11
2 +−++= LdLd eeee
L  , 
 
which is the sum of the Lerner indexes for the output monopolist and the input 
monopsonist with an interaction term (equal to the product of the two single 
power indexes) subtracted off.  The dual market power firm does not go as far in 
exploiting its power in either market as would the pure monopolist or the pure 
monopsonist.  To do so would generate the familiar “double marginalization” 
inefficiency that is observed when successive monopolists interact.19  The firm 
wisely takes into account the fact that a cut in output will also lead to some 
surplus recoupment in the input market, and therefore cuts output less 
aggressively than does the pure monopolist. 
 Even though the dual market monopolist cuts output less aggressively than 
does the pure monopolist, the harmful welfare effects of its exploitation are more 
severe.  Since L2 is greater than L, the effective price wedge relative to 
competition is greater in the dual market power case than in the single market 
monopoly case. 
 
B. Implications for Predation 
 
We can use the foregoing results on monopoly pricing and the Lerner index to 
compare the welfare implications of output market and input market predation.  In 
                                                 
19 Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 347 (1950). 
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addition, the comparative implications for consumer welfare offer insights on the 
proper legal standards for predation in output and input markets. 
 First, the monopoly pricing results confirm the Court’s suggestion that a firm 
may engage in input market predation in order to achieve monopsony power even 
if the firm sells in a perfectly competitive output market.20  In the case in which 
the output market is perfectly competitive, the elasticity of demand for the firm’s 
output (ed) will be infinite, so it will not be able profitably to set its output price 
above the competitive level.  However, if the firm can acquire monopsony power, 
it will be able to gain by pushing the input price below the competitive level after 
achieving monopsony, and this provides an incentive to the firm to engage in 
input market predation even when the output market is competitive. 
 Second, the monopoly pricing results imply that when input market predation 
is part of a strategy to achieve dominance in the output market, the welfare costs 
of input market predation are greater than those of output market predation.  The 
reason for this is that input predation, when used successfully as a part of a 
strategy to achieve an output market monopoly, results in dual market power.  
Other things being equal, dual market monopoly is more harmful to welfare than 
simple output monopoly.  This conclusion follows from the fact that the Lerner 
index for the dual market monopolization case is larger than the Lerner index for 
the single market standard monopolization case, which implies that the wedge 
between the firm’s price and the competitive price is greater in the dual market 
power setting. 
 Putting these two observations together, we arrive at a somewhat different 
position from that taken by the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser.  The Court could 
not see a persuasive reason to view input market predation as more harmful to 
consumers than output market predation.  The implication of this analysis is that 
input market predation is distinguishable on welfare grounds from output market 
predation.  In particular, input market predation, when it has the potential to 
enhance output market dominance, is likely to be more harmful to consumer 
welfare than is the standard case of output market predation.  And since input 
predation will often have the potential to enhance output market power, it seems 
reasonable to view input predation as especially worrisome.  
 It should be clear that the Brooke Group standard needs to be modified in the 
input predation scenario, since a firm may have an incentive to engage in input 
market predation even when the output market is competitive.  The dangerous –
probability prong of the Brooke Group standard should examine the prospects to 
achieve monopsony power in the input market as well as monopoly power in the 
output market.  Although the Court did not say this explicitly in Weyerhaeuser, 
this is implicit in its discussion of the dangerous probability test. 
                                                 
20 Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078. 
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 The bigger question is whether the “basic economic analysis” of the 
preceding part implies that the Brooke Group test should be replaced by a test that 
is more favorable to plaintiffs in the input market predation scenario.  I will 
explore this in more detail below. 
 
 
V. Error Costs and the Predation Standard 
 
A. Inadequacy of Incentives Analysis 
 
The basic economic analysis suggests, contrary to the Court’s view, that input 
market predation is distinguishable from output market predation in terms of its 
welfare effects, and that those effects imply that input market predation tends to 
be more costly to consumer welfare.  One might argue that this supports the Ninth 
Circuit’s view that the Brooke Group standard is inappropriate for input 
predation. 
 However it does not follow immediately, from the observation that input 
market predation is potentially more harmful than output market predation, that 
the standard of Brooke Group should be altered to permit plaintiffs to pursue 
predation claims more easily.  The case for the Brooke Group standard is not 
based solely on an examination of the economic incentives for predation.  It is 
based largely on “error cost” considerations. 
 Under the error cost (or decision theoretic) approach, the standard in Brooke 
Group is justified in light of the relative costs of false convictions and false 
acquittals.  In the output market predation context, false acquittals leave a 
dominant firm intact and unregulated by the antitrust laws.  That firm, however, is 
still subject to competitive pressures which regulate its freedom to exploit its 
market power.21  On the other hand, false convictions for predatory pricing punish 
firms for making competitive decisions that are essential for a competitive 
economy to function.  If firms worry about the risk of punishment every time they 
cut their prices, price cuts will be observed less often and consumers will suffer. 
 These arguments, as the Court noted in Weyerhaeuser, remain valid in the 
case of bidding for inputs.  There are procompetitive instances in which a firm 
may outbid its rivals for access to an input.  The law would discourage 
competition in this sphere if it were to punish firms in those instances.  The 
exclusion of cases in which the bidding firm is able to outbid rivals profitably, 
which the Court adopted as part of the price-cost test of Brooke Group,22 is a 
useful way to avoid punishing firms in instances of efficient outbidding. 
                                                 
21 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984). 
22 Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078. 
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 Hence, although basic economic analysis implies that input predation is 
potentially more harmful to consumer welfare than is output market predation, 
and therefore provides some support to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Brooke 
Group standard remains justifiable in the context of input market predation when 
error costs are taken in to account.  The mere fact that the welfare harms are likely 
to be greater in the context of input predation is insufficient, by itself, to support 
the conclusion that the Brooke Group standard should be modified in favor of 
plaintiffs in cases of input market predation.  In particular, the first prong of the 
Brooke Group standard, which requires the exclusion of cases in which the 
bidding firm outbids rivals profitably, may still be the best approach in light of the 
costs of false convictions. 
 There is a special case of dual market power setting that could require 
modification of the first prong of the Brooke Group test.  That is when the 
predator begins with market power in the output market and uses predatory 
bidding to gain monopsony power in the input market.  This is the dual market 
power acquisition scenario in reverse order.  In this case, the first prong of the 
Brooke Group test could fail to serve as a useful screen for separating 
procompetitive and anticompetitive instances of bidding.  If the firm has power in 
the output market, the first stage outcome might be one in which the firm’s output 
price increases during the predatory bidding phase.  This might occur because: (1) 
the firm’s marginal cost actually increases as a consequence of bidding up the 
input price,23 or (2) because the firm strategically increases its output price in 
order to evade detection under the first prong of the Brooke Group test.  In light 
of this possibility, courts should recognize that when the firm has the ability to 
increase its output price during the predatory bidding phase, the first prong of the 
test should not be rigidly applied.24 
 Consider the second prong of the Brooke Group standard, the dangerous 
probability requirement, in light of the basic economic analysis and in light of 
error costs.  The second prong of Brooke Group has required an examination of 
market structure and competition in the relevant market.  In the case of input 
market predation, examination of the output market alone will be insufficient as a 
screen on case quality.  The reason is that a firm may have an incentive to engage 
in input market predation even when the output market is competitive.  
                                                 
23 One can distinguish different input predation scenarios.   One is the lump sum transfer case, in 
which the predator pays a lump sum to purchase a stock of inputs or to pay off a supplier.  Another 
is spot market premium case, in which the bidder pays a higher price for every unit of the input 
during the predation phase.  These scenarios, and perhaps others, need to be distinguished in a 
careful analysis of the consequences of predatory bidding. 
24 Blair and Lopatka discuss this scenario and argue that a profit sacrifice test should be applied to 
the monopolist’s actions.  Blair & Lopatka, supra note 6, at 66. 
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 In order to avoid the outcome in which the dangerous probability requirement 
is meaningless as a constraint, courts should interpret the dangerous probability 
test to require an examination of market structure and competition in both the 
input and output markets.  If both markets are vulnerable to monopolization, then 
the likelihood that the firm’s conduct involved real predation should be viewed as 
considerably higher than in other scenarios. 
 To sum up, while basic economic analysis suggests specific ways in which 
the Brooke Group standard should be fine tuned to apply to input market 
predation, it is insufficient to justify a decision to replace Brooke Group with 
some alternative standard that is more favorable to plaintiffs in the input predation 
scenario.  Given that false convictions can occur in the input predation scenario, 
and that they can be costly as well, a stronger case must be offered for jettisoning 
Brooke Group than that suggested by the economic analysis of predation 
incentives. 
 I am concerned, however, that the Court has not provided a worthy account 
of the procompetitive benefits of outbidding rivals in the input market.  Neither 
has the Court provided as much detail as it should have in the application of the 
Brooke Group standard to input markets.  I will consider both questions in the 
remaining parts. 
 
B. Information and Prices 
 
Recall that the Court suggested four procompetitive justifications for the 
outbidding of rivals for access to inputs: (1) mistakes, (2) differentiated impacts 
of product market demand shocks, (3) greater productive efficiency on the part of 
the dominant firm, ad (4) hedging against risk.  The Court offered these 
justifications as reasons why conduct that appears to be input predation might be 
either unavoidable consequences of competition, or beneficial to the economy and 
to consumers. 
 At least three of the four justifications offered by the Court are based on 
information.  If you read the Court’s list of justifications and ask why each one 
might explain why one firm profitably outbids another, the most likely 
explanation in each case is informational asymmetry.  This is obviously so in the 
case of overbidding mistakes, which is a function of the allocation of information 
across market participants.  
 Suppose firm A outbids firm B because it is hedging against the risk of a 
future shortage of inputs.  Why should firm B be outbid on this basis?  The 
shortage will affect both firms in the same way.  The most likely reason for any 
difference in bids is that firm A possesses different predictions on the future 
availability of inputs than does firm B.  Those predictions are likely to be based 
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on information collected by firm A that firm B does not have.  Of course, firm A 
might outbid firm B on the basis of incorrect information. 
 If market demand shocks affect firms differently, that is likely to be the result 
of information differences.  Some firms will know about the market demand 
shocks and others may not know.  Alternatively, some firms may understand the 
implications of the market demand shocks better than other firms.  Even if 
products are differentiated, information is probably the key reason demand shocks 
might affect firms differently in their bidding for inputs.  For example, suppose 
two firms offer differentiated products on the output market while bidding for the 
same input.  Suppose an exogenous change in consumer tastes, say due to 
immigration, increases the demand for one firm’s product relative to the other.  
This may lead the in-demand firm to outbid its rival (out-of-demand firm) for 
inputs.  But, in this scenario, the inputs have actually increased in value by the 
extent of the in-demand firm’s new bids.  The only reason the out-of-demand firm 
might be outbid is because it cannot afford to pay the new market price, in which 
case its exclusion from access to inputs is efficient, or because it cannot observe 
or predict the new market value of the inputs. 
 These examples suggest an especially important feature of markets that is 
easy to overlook in the predation context.  Prices are signals and stores of 
information.25  Whenever antitrust law disrupts the market processes by which 
prices are established, it threatens to obstruct a core function of the market. 
 The Court recognizes the importance of price setting in the competitive 
process.  In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,26 the 
Court referred to competitive pricing as the “central nervous system of the 
economy” and suggested that the per se rule should not be applied unless the 
challenged agreement threatens that system.27  This protective view of the role of 
competitive pricing appears to play some role in the Court’s predatory pricing 
case law.  The Brooke Group standard is based in part on the concern that false 
convictions that discourage price cutting decisions would be especially costly 
because of the importance of those decisions to competition. 
 The Court’s argument in Weyerhaeuser fails to get across any sense that 
decisions to bid up prices, just as decisions to cut prices, play a role in the central 
nervous system of an economy.  Prices are bid up when supply fails to meet 
demand at preexisting prices.  A law that threatens punishment on a market actor 
who bids prices up would have undesirable consequences. 
 Prices convey information.  While the simple textbook analysis of market 
prices tells us that prices are bid up so that supply can meet demand, there is an 
                                                 
25 On prices and information, see F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 519 (1945). 
26 441 U.S. 1 (1979) 
27 Id. at 23. 
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underlying question of who knows when supply is insufficient to meet demand.  
When supplies have to be generated in advance of the actual transfer to buyers, 
who knows when future supply will be unable to meet future demand?  
Government bureaucrats, lawyers, and economists are not the ones who know.  
Market participants, who have a direct stake in finding the answers, are the ones 
who discover when supply is unlikely to meet demand.  The price system permits 
those actors to gain by taking advantage of this information and purchasing 
inputs, bidding up their prices.  The price increases convey information to 
suppliers that induces them to bring forth greater supply to the market. 
 The biggest gains for bidding up prices will go to those who discover and act 
first on information suggesting that current or future supply may be insufficient to 
meet demand.  The price system rewards those who are best suited to find 
information or predict shortages or excesses of supply.  The first one to act bids 
on inputs before any information of an upcoming shortage has affected prices.  
When the information begins to spread and input prices rise, the first actor earns 
the greatest profits from having acted early.  In this way, the price system 
encourages those who are most efficient at discovering information on market 
conditions to act on that information promptly, thereby communicating their 
information to the market.  The ability of these actors to gain from acting on their 
private information ensures that their information will be revealed, rather than sat 
upon and ignored. 
 Antitrust has not given sufficient weight to the informational role of prices.  
The tendency of antitrust courts to focus on price cutting as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare has taken them away from thinking about the function of prices 
as signals and conveyors of private information. 
 I have set out my description of pricing as information in the context of input 
bidding, but the argument applies to output price setting as well.  One could argue 
that when a firm sets a price for its product, it is also conveying information about 
what it thinks the market will bear.  This argument implies that some instances of 
alleged predation may reflect the dominant firm’s assessment that the demand for 
its product will decline in the future.  For example, the firm may recognize that 
demand will decline in the future, and decide to cut price in the present in order to 
maintain its customer base in future periods. 
 While it is true that the information-conveyance view of price setting applies 
to output pricing as well as to bidding for inputs, the argument seems especially 
applicable to the input bidding case.  The relationship between information and 
prices is different in the input bidding and output pricing scenarios. 
 In the input bidding scenario, the bidding firm does not have direct control 
over the supply or quantity of the input on the market.  This lack of control is 
obvious when the bidding firm is not a monopsonist.  In contrast, when the 
bidding firm has monopsony power, it enjoys some degree of control over the 
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quantity of the input.  But even in the monopsony setting, the bidding firm still 
has far less than direct control.  The input supplier can always refuse to accept the 
monopsonist’s price.  For example, in a monopsonized labor market, the workers 
could always form a union and convert the monopsony setting into one of 
bilateral monopoly. 
 In the absence of direct control over the quantity of the input, the bidding 
firm is always in the position of having to be concerned about its access to the 
input.  If access to the input is not guaranteed, the bidding firm will have to 
predict future supply and demand conditions in order to avoid being “caught out” 
without access to the input.  This means that bidding firms have incentives to 
monitor input markets and collect information on them.  The potential scarcity of 
the input offers a reward to the bidding seller who best predicts the future state of 
the input market – e.g., whether a shortage or excess appears. 
 The situation is different for the dominant firm that must determine how to 
price its own output.  The dominant firm seller has direct control over its own 
quantity.  As long as it has access to its inputs and its production process 
functions, the dominant firm does not confront the risk of being caught out 
without access to its own product.  
 Since the risk of being shut down is higher in the input bidding than in the 
output pricing scenario, the incentive to monitor and to collect information on 
market conditions is greater in the input bidding scenario.  As a result, the 
connection between information and bidding is probably a bit stronger in the input 
bidding scenario than in the output-price setting scenario. 
 The error cost framework of Brooke Group is incomplete because it does not 
explicitly incorporate the informational role of prices.  This informational role is 
especially important in the input bidding scenario. It follows that in thinking 
about the costs of false convictions for predation, courts should attempt to 
consider the effects a legal standard governing predation might have on incentives 
to convey information to markets.  Moreover, if one had to identify the central 
nervous system of the economy, it is most likely to be found in the information 
role of pricing rather than in the benefits received by consumers from short-run 
price cutting.   
  
C. Some Implications for the Weyerhaeuser Analysis 
 
The Court’s analysis in Weyerhaeuser is based in part on the rather weak 
argument that ultimate consumers may not be harmed by input market predation, 
and that therefore there may be no need to regulate such predation in order to 
protect consumers.  This is not the best choice from the menu of possible 
arguments, for several reasons. 
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 First, the Court’s decision to focus on ultimate consumers rather than 
suppliers of inputs, as beneficiaries of input predation, may turn out to be a 
regrettable decision in the long run.  If one focuses on suppliers of inputs, one 
sees that the benefits to those suppliers are entirely analogous to the benefits to 
ultimate consumers from output price predation.  Explicitly recognizing this 
analogy in the text of the Court’s argument (rather than in a single footnote) 
would have made the argument for the Brooke Group standard a bit more 
persuasive, and aided lower courts in analyzing problems such as this.28 
 Second, the Court’s claim that consumer may not be harmed by successful 
input market predation is questionable.  If the input market predation is 
successful, it will result in some reduction in supply from the monopsony firm – 
since a monopsonist uses less than the competitive quantity of the monopsonized 
input.  That cutback in supply will reduce consumer welfare, though the effect 
may be small.29  
 Third, even if the negative effect of input predation on ultimate consumers is 
trivial, this is hardly an argument in favor of enforcement passivity.  The Court’s 
argument, examined closely, is really this: in some cases, input market predation 
harms consumers greatly; in others, it harms them not much at all.  To focus on 
the “not much at all” case is a reason for enforcement passivity is unpersuasive. 
 As I have suggested, the “basic economics” case for enforcement passivity in 
the input predation setting is weak.  Input predation appears, on the basis of an 
economic analysis of predation incentives, to be at least as harmful as output 
market predation and potentially more harmful.  The Court would aid the 
reasoning of lower courts by recognizing these implications of economic analysis. 
 The argument for applying the Brooke Group standard to input predation is, 
in the end, not closely connected to basic economic analysis.  The argument is 
mostly based on the error cost framework.  And it is at this stage where it appears 
that the argument in favor of the Brooke Group standard is at least as strong, and 
perhaps stronger, than in the case of output market predation. 
                                                 
28 Indeed, as Blair and Lopatka explain, supra note 6 at 37, one can read at least one Supreme 
Court decision, Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, as 
explicitly recognizing the statute’s protection of the producers surplus earned by suppliers in a 
competitive market.  The Court could have easily cited Mandeville Island Farms as a basis for 
treating the gains to suppliers during the first stage of a predatory bidding campaign as analogous 
to the gains to buyers in the first stage of a predatory pricing campaign. 
29 This conclusion contradicts that reached in Salop, supra note 6, at 673.  Although the predatory 
firm may purchase more of the input during the predatory campaign (and even this is not clear, 
since the predatory firm might simply pay a higher price without purchasing a greater quantity), 
this strikes me to be short run consideration.  In the long term, the successful predator gains 
monopsony power, which is harmful to the welfare of suppliers and of consumers, though the 
effect on consumers may be small.  For similar points, see Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Monopsony and 
the Ross-Simons Case: A Comment on Salop and Kirkwood, 72 Antitrust L. J. 717 (2005). 
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 Input pricing is an important part of the economy’s central nervous system.  
In most instances, it takes place in open competitive markets, and reflects bidders’ 
information on the scarcity of inputs.  In order for markets in inputs to function, 
these bids must communicate information relatively quickly.  An antitrust rule 
that threatens punishment to firms that act quickly to bid up input prices poses a 
threat to well ordered markets. 
 
VI. Reconciling Weyerhaeuser with Labor Antitrust 
 
There is a line of cases involving input market predation known as labor antitrust 
cases.  These are cases in which a union forms an agreement with an employer or 
group of employers that has the effect of obstructing competition among the 
employers.30  Labor is an input into production, and it is by far the most common 
example of predation in input markets.  In some of the cases, the Court has found 
an antitrust violation.  It would have been helpful for the Court to explain the 
differences between these cases and Weyerhaeuser. 
 Consider United Mine Workers v. Pennington.31  The United Mine Workers 
made an agreement with one set of employers to set wages at levels that would be 
prohibitively expensive for competing nonunion employers.32  The wage 
agreement was set with the purpose of driving less efficient competitors out of the 
market.33  The Court had to determine whether the antitrust laws applied to such 
an agreement, or whether it fell under the labor exemption to antitrust.  The Court 
held that the antitrust laws applied, affirming a lower court finding that the 
agreement violated the antitrust laws.34 
 If we step back and look at the most general features of Pennington, it looks a 
lot like the plaintiff’s version of the events in Weyerhaeuser.  In Pennington, one 
group of employers (buyers) made a labor agreement (purchase agreement) that 
set the wage (price of the input) at a level that would bankrupt rival employers 
(competing input buyers).  The Court did not adopt a high barrier of the sort 
articulated in Brooke Group for the plaintiffs in Pennington.  Of course, 
Pennington preceded Brooke Group, but the Court has never suggested that the 
Brooke Group standard should be applied to a case like Pennington.  Is this an 
instance in which similar cases are being treated differently, or are there 
differences between Weyerhaeuser and Pennington? 
                                                 
30 For a discussion of the economics of labor antitrust cases, see Oliver E. Williamson, Wage 
Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q. J. Econ. 85 (1968); Keith 
N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 471, 520-22 (1993). 
31 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
32 Id. at 660. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 668. 
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 In fact there are important differences, and it may help to clarify the case for 
or against applying the Brooke Group standard to input predation by considering 
the differences.  First, the labor antitrust cases such as Pennington involve explicit 
conspiracies.  Antitrust law has applied more plaintiff-favorable standards to 
conspiracies, and this is widely considered to be justified by the error cost 
rationale provided long ago by the Court in Trenton Potteries.35 
 Setting aside the distinction between conspiracy and unilateral conduct, it is 
possible to identify other ways in which the type of predation in Pennington 
differs from the predation alleged in Weyerhaeuser.  In the labor antitrust setting, 
the union has the power to control the supply of labor inputs.  This level of 
control over the market for inputs is not observed in Weyerhaeuser. 
 Consider an example in which there are two input buyers (A and B) and two 
input suppliers (C and D).  Suppose A attempts to bid the price of the input up to a 
level that would bankrupt B.  Unless there is an agreement between input 
suppliers C and D, one of them would have an incentive to sell excess inputs 
(inputs that will not be purchased by A) to B at a discount.  In addition, the 
excessive bids offered by A will tempt other input sellers to enter the market.  
Predation is unlikely to be successful under these conditions. 
 Suppose, however, C and D form an iron-clad agreement to sell at the same 
price, which is the level determined by A’s excessive bids.  Suppose also that C 
and D can effectively block entry by competing input suppliers by withholding 
inputs to any firm that purchases inputs from any other supplier.  This scenario is 
a closer fit to the facts of Pennington. 
 In Pennington the agreement between the union and the employer led to the 
elimination of less efficient firms.  If this is viewed under the Brooke Group 
standard, as applied to input predation, then the price-cost test would not be 
satisfied.  In other words, Brooke Group requires the plaintiff to show that the 
input predation led to a period in which marginal cost was driven above price for 
the predator firm.  But this is not the case in Pennington because the agreement 
was designed to eliminate only the less efficient firms.  Still, Pennington involved 
a conspiracy, which could justify treating the case differently from one of 
unilateral conduct. 
 Suppose the agreement in Pennington had been designed to eliminate equally 
efficient firms.  Then the first prong of the Brooke Group standard, as applied to 
input predation, would be satisfied.  The second prong of the standard, the 
dangerous probability requirement, would probably be satisfied too.  The reason 
is that the union in Pennington had the power to block the entry of competing 
input suppliers.  The predatory scheme in Pennington would permit the predating 
                                                 
35 United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).  Trenton Potteries provides the error 
cost rationale for the per illegality rule governing price fixing. 
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firm to eliminate competitors and to remain in the market relatively free from the 
threat of entry by competitors. 
 Pennington permits us to construct a hypothetical case in which the Brooke 
Group standard would most likely be satisfied.  By using such examples to 
distinguish and defend the decision in Weyerhaeuser, the Court could have 
provided useful guidance for lower courts, and answered the critique that the 
Brooke Group standard is essentially a per se legality rule. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
There is a rigorous basis for concluding that predatory bidding and predatory 
pricing are analytically distinct, as the Ninth Circuit did when it rejected the 
Brooke Group standard in Weyerhaeuser.  The incentive to engage in predation, 
as measured by the potential reward, is greater in the bidding context than in the 
pricing context.  Predatory bidding may lead to a dual market power outcome in 
which the predator has market power in both the input and the output market.  The 
welfare costs of dual market monopoly are greater than those of single market 
monopoly. 
 However, the core rationale for the Brooke Group standard is based more on 
error cost considerations than on an economic analysis of incentives to engage in 
predation.  False convictions are potentially costly to society in their effects on 
information transmission in bidding markets.  There is no obvious reason to 
believe that false conviction costs in bidding markets are any less worrisome than 
false conviction costs in output markets. 
